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As an issue with a great deal of relevance to ongoing historical and social events,
prejudice has captured the attention of empirical social psychologists almost since the inception
of social psychology. However, the relevance of prejudice to current events has meant that, as
the treatment of minorities in American society has changed over time, so too has researchers’
conceptualization of prejudice. The result of these changes in conceptualization is that some
ideas that were developed within a particular historical context have since been abandoned to the
dustbin of outmoded psychological theory as changing historical circumstances have made those
ideas (apparently) irrelevant to the new societal context (Meehl, 1978).
The tendency to perhaps prematurely abandon once promising research ideas is only
exacerbated by the fact that, as a construct, “prejudice” is difficult to conceptualize and
accurately define (Devine, 1995). The phenomena that are supposedly linked to prejudice span
the affective, cognitive, biological, and behavioral domains, and these phenomena can exist at
intrapersonal, interpersonal, intragroup, and intergroup levels. The result of these disparate
aspects of prejudice is that, over time, researchers’ definitions of prejudice have emphasized
different aspects of these phenomena and levels of analysis (Devine, 1995).
An additional complication is that most people view prejudice as a topic that is highly
relevant to their moral values (Devine, Monteith, Zuwerink, & Elliot, 1991; Allport, 1954). This
relevance to morals makes the definition of prejudice particularly subject to personal
interpretation, and also means that intentions, which have been the object of their own vigorous
scientific debates (e.g., Bargh & Chartrand, 1999; Ryan & Deci, 2006), play a central role in
many definitions of prejudice. Overall, the difficulties in defining prejudice and the relevance of
definitions of prejudice to moral values has made researchers’ conceptualizations of prejudice
particularly sensitive to historical events (Duckitt, 1992).

The interaction between historical events and researchers’ changing conceptualizations of
prejudice is exemplified by researchers’ assumptions about the intentionality of prejudice.
Whereas early in the empirical study of prejudice, most researchers assumed that prejudice was
driven mostly by intentional processes (Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswik, Levinson, & Sanford, 1950),
most modern researchers focus on the unintentional aspects of prejudice (e.g., Devine, 1989;
Fazio, Jackson, Dunton, & Williams, 1995; Crandall & Eshleman, 2003).
In this chapter, we will draw on previous treatments of the history of prejudice research
(Devine, 1995; Duckitt, 1992; Milner, 1983) to conduct an historical review of how events in
both the real world and the research world have shaped researchers’ conceptualizations of the
intentionality of prejudice. We argue that, while early research focused on the intentional
aspects of prejudice, modern research focuses more exclusively on the unintentional aspects of
prejudice. As a result of the modern overattention to the unintentional aspects of prejudice,
researchers have ignored the possibility that some people are motivated to express prejudice
(Forscher & Devine, in preparation). Through our argument, we hope to build a bridge between
modern and classic insights into prejudice processes.
Early conceptions of prejudice: Prejudice follows from negative intentions
Prior to the 1920s, social scientists accepted the premise of White racial superiority, and
theories of race were used as tools to support and justify White supremacy (Haller, 1971).
However, the rise of the early Civil Rights movement in the 1920s caused some social scientists
to question whether race-based stereotypes and antipathy were justified, leading to the first
empirical efforts to define, identify, and measure racial prejudice (e.g., Bogardus, 1925;
Guilford, 1931). The earliest of these studies typically involved surveying respondents about

their feelings towards one or more social groups and describing how these feelings varied across
occupations, races, and other social categories.
Over time, however, prejudice researchers began to shift from simple description of
prejudice to explanation of its origins. In these explanations, prejudice researchers used
correlational methods, case studies, and towards the end of the 1940s, experiments to attempt to
explain race-based antipathy in terms of Freudian defense mechanisms, which were presumed to
be universal features of human psychology (e.g., MacCrone, 1937; Veltfort & Lee, 1943,
Dollard, Doob, Miller, Mowrer, & Sears, 1939). Although many researchers following the
psychodynamic approach to prejudice used the correlational methods of the previous decades,
other researchers added case studies and experiments to the methodological toolbox used to
understand prejudice. Overall, researchers following the psychodynamic approach portrayed
prejudice as a normal byproduct of ordinary psychological processes. Moreover, intentions did
not figure prominently in this conceptualization.
Prejudice research underwent a dramatic transformation in theory if not in method
following revelations of the horrific events of the Holocaust during World War II. The antiSemitism that drove the Holocaust seemed to stem from explicitly articulated intentions to
oppress and murder Jews. Thus, conceptualizations of prejudice that did not incorporate
intentions seemed inadequate to explain the events of the scale and magnitude of the Holocaust.
Moreover, if the dominant theoretical analyses of the previous decades were correct and
prejudice stemmed from ordinary psychological processes, the unsettling implication was that
the psychological seeds that bore the bitter fruits of the Holocaust were present in everyone (see
Milgram, 1963). As a means of distancing prejudice from ordinary people, researchers began to
emphasize the intentional, pathological, and / or abnormal aspects of prejudice.

Because this new theoretical approach portrayed prejudice as abnormal or pathological,
the intrapsychic processes that were assumed to cause prejudice were similarly characterized as
abnormal or pathological. These processes ranged from personality characteristics (e.g., Adorno,
Frenkel-Brunswik, Levinson, & Sanford, 1950) to belief structures (e.g., Rokeach, 1973), all of
which were assumed to be closely embedded with one’s sense of self. Because researchers
assumed that change in prejudice required change in the intrapsychic processes that gave rise to
prejudice (Rokeach, 1973), change in prejudice, when it did happen, was assumed to be a
difficult and sometimes arduous process requiring substantial personal change. Although a few
prejudice researchers attempted to tackle the challenge of changing the underlying psychological
variables presumed to promote prejudice (Rokeach, 1973), more often prejudice researchers
developed tools to identify the people who might be prone to prejudice so that broader society
could take steps to ameliorate the potentially dangerous influence of these people.
Although the intensely person-focused approach of post-World War II research did not
survive the early years of prejudice research, the more general effects of World War II and the
Holocaust on prejudice research lingered beyond the immediate postwar era. Specifically, for
decades after World War II, prejudice researchers assumed that prejudice arose because of
negative intentions towards a specific out-group. Researchers did shift over time in terms of
where they located the ultimate cause of these negative intentions, first preferring individual
causes such as pathological patterns of personality (Adorno et al., 1950) and illogical belief
structures (Rokeach, 1973), and later preferring social causes such as early childhood
socialization experiences (Westie, 1964) and conformity (Pettigrew, 1958). However, a unifying
theme of these disparate causal explanations is that they identified prejudice with intentional
actions and processes.

The assumption that prejudice is driven by negative intentions lingered even as the
changes wrought by the Civil Rights Movement made the expression of overtly negative
sentiments toward out-groups socially unacceptable. As national surveys revealed steady
improvements in people’s reported racial attitudes (Schuman, Steeh, Bobo, & Krysan, 1997),
researchers were reluctant to conclude that these changes in reported attitudes extended to
genuine changes in “prejudice”. Indeed, as outcomes for outgroups failed to improve alongside
people’s reported attitudes, prejudice researchers speculated that prejudice had gone
underground and taken on a new, “modern” form (McConahay, 1983). Under this explanation,
although the “old-fashioned” forms of prejudice were no longer expressed in public, prejudice
was still revealed through covert patterns of behavior that could not be easily attributed by
observers to negative intentions toward the outgroup (Gaertner & Dovidio, 1986; Kinder &
Sears, 1981).
The general suspicion that survey evidence did not reflect the reality of people’s hidden,
underlying levels of “modern” prejudice, together with a theoretical analysis that argued that
people were motivated to hide their “true” levels of prejudice from others, inspired researchers to
devise new methods of assessing prejudice that did not rely on surveys or self-reports. These
new methods relied on behaviors, such helping, that were clearly valenced, but for which no one
particular level of the behavior could be clearly attributed to “prejudice”. By experimentally
manipulating whether the target of the chosen behavior was a White person or a Black person
and comparing the positivity or negativity of the behavior towards the two different targets,
researchers could assess whether, on average, Black people were subject to subtle forms of
discrimination. To the extent that Black people were indeed treated more negatively or less
positively than White people, the difference was attributed to prejudice, with the concomitant

implication that the participants in the study possessed negative intentions towards out-groups
(Crosby, Bromley, & Saxe, 1980).
As evidence accumulated that, in situations where a response could not obviously be
attributed to prejudice, people behaved more negatively and less positively towards Blacks than
towards Whites, researchers became increasingly disenchanted with self-report measures and
increasingly cynical that prejudice could be changed (Crosby, Bromley, & Saxe, 1980). In
effect, researchers had shifted their conceptualization of prejudice such that any behavioral
response that resulted in a relatively unfavorable outcome for a minority group member was
considered evidence for prejudiced beliefs and / or intentions, and any overt protestations to the
contrary were considered mere self-presentation. As Crosby and her colleagues (pg. 557) put it,
many researchers concluded that “. . . whites today are, in fact, more prejudiced than they are
wont to admit.” This shift in conceptualization was a dramatic change from the earlier era, in
which self-reports were taken as face-value indicators of beliefs. Although consistent with the
available evidence, the shift in conceptualization had the unfortunate side-effect of leaving the
route to reducing and eliminating the disparity between reported attitudes and behavior unclear.
Although Crosby and her colleagues’ (1980) conclusion was consistent with the thendominant conceptualization of prejudice, the contradiction between self-reports and
discriminatory behavior had an alternative explanation. Specifically, perhaps the improvements
in reported attitudes did, in fact, reflect genuine changes in intentions, but some biasing process
or set of processes prevented people from fully translating these intentions to behave fairly into
unbiased behavior. Moreover, to the extent that the biasing processes operate without people
being aware of them, people may not even be aware of any inconsistency between their verbal
reports and behavior.

If one accepts that discriminatory behavior can arise from unintentional processes despite
intentions that are inconsistent with prejudice, one must consider the conclusion that a substantial
percentage of discrimination is caused by unintentional processes. One corollary of this
conclusion is that subtle differences in behavior towards Whites and minorities can no longer be
taken as prima facie evidence of negative intentions toward out-groups. A second corollary is
that, one might be able to harness people’s good intentions to disrupt the influence of the
unintentional biases, thereby reducing or even eliminating subtle discriminatory behavior
(Devine, 1989).
Overall, the interpretation of the disparity between self-reports and subtle behavior as
stemming from unintentional processes requires a major shift in researchers’ conceptualization
of prejudice. Instead of conceiving of prejudice as antipathy stemming from negative intentions,
prejudice is linked more to the processes that prevent the translation of intentions into behavior
or lead to discriminatory behavior in opposition to egalitarian intentions. This
reconceptualization flew in the face of long-standing assumptions that characterized prejudice
and discrimination as intentional. In fact, the alternative interpretation of the discrepancy
between self-reports and behavior would not be taken seriously until the development of new
theory and methods in the 1990s.
Modern conceptions of prejudice: Prejudice follows from unintentional associations
A turning point in the empirical study of prejudice came with the introduction of the
prejudice habit model (Devine, 1989). The prejudice habit model distinguishes between
controlled and automatic processes and argues that, whereas controlled processes reflect people’s
beliefs, automatic processes reflect the associations acquired from broader culture. While
people’s beliefs are argued to stem from values and intentions, both of which are central to a

person’s self-concept, automatic associations are argued to stem from frequently activated
pairings of groups with stereotypic characteristics. Thus, to the extent that a person believes that
the use of stereotypes about a particular group is wrong, that person’s automatic associations
about the group may nonetheless conflict with those beliefs. Moreover, because stereotypic
pairings occur so frequently in the social environment, merely encountering a member of the
group is sufficient to trigger stereotypic associates that are paired with that out-group. The
implication of this analysis is that even people who believe that discrimination is wrong may
nonetheless behave in ways that have negative consequences for outgroups, provided that
situational constraints prevent controlled processes from inhibiting the influence of automatic
stereotypes.
The prejudice habit model thus provided the theoretical framework needed to reinterpret
the disparity between self-reports and behavior as stemming from unintentional processes.
Rather than assuming that all self-reports reflect strategic self-presentation, the prejudice habit
model argues that self-reports very often reflect genuine intentions to respond without prejudice.
Rather than assuming that subtly discriminatory behavior reflects a “modern” form of prejudice
that is only revealed when observers are unable to clearly attribute one’s behavior to negative
intentions, the prejudice habit model argues that subtle discrimination stems from situational
factors that prevent controlled processes from overriding automatic processes. The more radical
effect of the new theoretical framework, however, was the new way in which the framework
caused modern prejudice researchers to reconceptualize prejudice. Specifically, instead of
identifying “prejudice” as intentional, many modern prejudice research has come to identify
prejudice as equivalent to automatic stereotypic associations (e.g., Crandall & Eshleman, 2003;
Fazio, Jackson, Dunton, & Williams, 1995; Banaji & Greenwald, 1995). Because stereotypic

associations operate independently from and despite countervailing intentions, many researchers’
conceptualizations of prejudice are largely divorced from intentions.
The new dissociation between intentions and prejudice has had a dramatic effect on the
collective research agenda. If one accepts the premise that “prejudice” can occur despite
countervailing intentions, the most logical research agenda is one that allows the identification of
the factors that increase or decrease susceptibility to unintentional bias. In line with this logic,
identifying factors that affect susceptibility to unintentional bias has dominated the modern
research agenda. This task has required new methodological tools that allow the direct
measurement the unintentional biases. Obtaining such direct measures would avoid the
ambiguity inherent in the subtle bias experiments of the 1970s and 1980s, in which the processes
causing disparities between self-reports and pro-White behavior were unclear. The development
of such direct measures has been the major methodological revolution of the modern era.
Modern prejudice researchers now have a broad array of cognitive (e.g., Greenwald, McGhee, &
Schwartz, 1998; Fazio et al., 1995; Payne, Cheng, Govorun, & Stewart, 2005), mathematical
(Payne, 2001; Conrey, Sherman, Gawronski, Hugenberg, & Groom, 2005), and neuroscientific
(Amodio, Devine, & Harmon-Jones, 2008; Amodio et al., 2004; Amodio, Harmon-Jones, &
Devine, 2003) tools at their disposal that allow them to precisely document the interplay between
controlled and automatic processes in the production of unintentional bias.
Using these new theoretical analyses and methodological tools, modern prejudice
researchers have discovered that unintentional bias only occurs in specific situations where selfcontrol resources are limited and / or where there is no clear “non-prejudiced” response (Devine,
1989). Modern prejudice researchers have also developed a large number of strategies that
reduce automatic stereotypic associations, at least for short periods of time (e.g., Todd,

Bodenhausen, Richeson, & Galinsky, 2011; Kawakami et al., 2000; Dasgupta & Greenwald,
2001). If these strategies are presented to people in the context of a larger program designed to
elicit motivation to respond without prejudice and awareness of unintentional bias and its
consequences, people who exert effort practicing the strategies create long-term reductions in
their susceptibility to unintentional bias (Devine, Forscher, Austin, & Cox, 2012). To the extent
that unintentional bias contributes to society-wide disparities, the modern focus on unintentional
bias may have provided insights that are useful for broader issues beyond the thorny theoretical
problems of past researchers.
Despite spurring many productive lines of research, we argue that the intense focus on
unintentional bias has had some inadvertent negative consequences for prejudice research. First,
the focus on unintentional bias may have made prejudice researchers less thoughtful about the
ways in which they use self-report measures. Second, this focus has limited the range of
phenomena that prejudice researchers attempt to explain. Finally, the focus on unintentional bias
has placed artificial limitations on the range of interventions prejudice researchers develop to
address problems related to prejudice.
The first inadvertent consequence, that of making prejudice researchers less thoughtful
about their use of self-report measures, is illustrated in the limited range of purposes to which
modern prejudice researchers put self-report measures. More specifically, modern prejudice
researchers generally use self-report measures in one of two ways. First, prejudice researchers
use self-report measures as indicators of positive intentions (e.g., Plant & Devine, 1998; Dunton
& Fazio, 1997) or the “controlled processes” that, according to the prejudice habit model, often
conflict with automatic stereotypic associations (e.g., Devine, 1989, McConnell & Leibold,
2001). Research that uses self-report measures as indicators of controlled processes tends to

focus on the circumstances in which controlled processes are subverted by unintentional bias
(e.g., Devine, 1989; Payne, 2001; Amodio, Devine, & Harmon-Jones, 2008). Thus, a substantial
proportion of research that uses self-report measures as indicators of controlled processes focuses
on highlighting the situations in which self-report measures do not predict behavior.
The second way in which modern prejudice researchers use self-report measures is as the
controlled counterpart to measures of automatic stereotypic associations (e.g., Greenwald,
McGhee, & Schwartz; McConnell & Leibold, 2001; Hugenberg & Bodenhausen, 2003;
Greenwald, Poehlman, Uhlmann, & Banaji, 2009). Research that uses self-report measures in
this way tends to focus on theoretically and empirically validating measures of automatic
associations by showing that they relate to behavior in circumstances that self-report measures
do not. Thus, research that uses self-report measures as the controlled counterpart to implicit
measures is often focused on documenting the ways in which self-report measures predict
behavior less well than implicit measures. In sum, modern prejudice research, with its somewhat
narrow focus on unintentional bias, uses self-report measures as mere points of comparison for
implicit measures, with the result that researchers are less thoughtful about the ways in which
self-report measures could be informative for their research.
The second inadvertent consequence of the field’s current focus on unintentional bias is a
narrowing of the range of phenomena that prejudice researchers attempt to explain. The
theoretical analysis at the foundation of modern prejudice research focuses on explaining the
paradox that some people’s subtly discriminatory behavior contradicts self-reports that prohibit
prejudice. However, explaining the reasons for this contradiction requires focusing on precisely
the behaviors that were labeled “modern prejudice” by the researchers who originally discovered
the paradox. Thus, when modern prejudice researchers attempt to explain the psychology of a

particular behavior that they believe might be driven by unintentional/automatic biases, they
typically choose behaviors such as seating distance (Kawakami, Phills, Steele, & Dovidio, 2007),
eye contact (Dovidio, Kawakami, & Gaertner, 2002), and speech disfluencies (McConnell &
Leibold, 2001) as their outcome variables. Although these behaviors might have important
consequences in everyday interactions, they represent only a small subset of the universe of
intergroup behaviors relevant to prejudice. Perhaps most importantly, focusing on the
psychological determinants of subtle, mostly unintentional behavior ignores the psychology of
more extreme, mostly intentional behavior, such as hate speech or hate crimes. The fact that
prejudice researchers have ignored more extreme, intentional behavior is perhaps understandable
given that such behavior is relatively difficult to study in the lab, but our ignorance of more
extreme, intentional behavior is strange given the lasting legacies of slavery and the Holocaust
on prejudice research.
The last inadvertent consequence of the field’s current focus on unintentional bias, the
placement of artificial limitations on the interventions that prejudice researchers develop, is
closely tied to the fact that modern prejudice researchers have focused rather narrowly on
explaining and understanding unintentional bias. To the extent that prejudice researchers define
prejudice as unintentional bias, prejudice researchers developing remedies to social problems
involving prejudice will focus their efforts on reducing unintentional bias. Indeed, in the past
twenty years, national institutions and scholars alike have identified unintentional bias as perhaps
the primary factor promoting the maintenance of societal gender, racial, and ethnic disparities
(e.g., Smedley, Stith, & Nelson, 2003; Devine, Forscher, Austin, & Cox, 2012; Bertrand &
Mullainathan, 2004; Fiske, 1998). However, there is scant direct evidence supporting the
privileged position of unintentional bias in promoting societal disparities (but see van den Bergh,

Denessen, Hornstra, Voeten, & Holland, 2010). Although unintentional bias may contribute to
ongoing disparities, ignoring the role of other causal factors will lead to interventions that are
less effective than those that take a multi-pronged approach (Forscher & Devine, in press).
We have argued that modern prejudice research is perhaps too focused on understanding
the problem of unintentional bias and have argued that this focus has unintended methodological,
conceptual, and practical consequences for our overall understanding of intergroup phenomena.
In the final section of this chapter, we will describe a methodological tool, a scale measuring the
motivation to express prejudice, which we developed to help address some of the shortcomings
of the focus on unintentional bias. We will also describe how the development of this
methodological tool was informed by puzzling empirical patterns in research on the motivation
to respond without prejudice.
Integrating past and modern insights: The case study of the motivation to express prejudice
The development of the motivation to express prejudice scale grew out of puzzling
patterns extant in research on one of the central concerns of modern prejudice research, the
reasons people are motivated to respond without prejudice. Plant and Devine (1998) have
argued that these reasons can be classified into internal (personal, value-driven) and external
(social, norm-driven) categories. Motivation that stems from internal sources arises out of
personal values that are inconsistent with the expression of prejudice. Internal motivation tends
to lead people to adopt strict, well-internalized, personally-endorsed standards that prohibit even
subtle expressions of prejudice (Devine, Monteith, Zuwerink, & Elliot, 1991; Monteith, Devine,
& Zuwerink, 1993). Violations of these standards are perceived by internally motivated people
as moral failures (Devine et al., 1991), leading to guilt and later efforts to prevent future
deviations from the standards (Amodio, Devine, & Harmon-Jones, 2007; Monteith, 1993;

Monteith et al., 2002). In sum, the overall goal of primarily internally motivated people is to
reduce and eliminate their prejudice, regardless of whether that prejudice can be detected by
others (Plant & Devine, 2009).
In contrast, motivation that stems from external sources is driven by a concern over
violating the pervasive anti-prejudiced norms by appearing prejudiced to others. Instead of
leading to the adoption of personally-endorsed standards prohibiting prejudice, external
motivation tends to lead people to adopt what they perceive to be the standards of others in the
regulation of their behavior (Plant & Devine, 1998; Plant & Devine, 2001; Plant & Devine,
2009). Violations of these social standards lead people who are primarily externally motivated
to feel threatened and to attempt to hide the violation from others (Plant & Devine, 2001). In
sum, in contrast to the goal adopted by people who are primarily internally motivated, primarily
externally motivated people have the goal of hiding their expressions of prejudice from others
(Plant & Devine, 2009).
An interesting aspect of the internal and external motivations to respond without
prejudice is that these two motivations are essentially uncorrelated; people can be high in one
type of motivation, both, or neither. Much of the research on the motivations to respond without
prejudice has involved uncovering the regulatory patterns of the four motivational subgroups
arising from the combinations of these two factors.
Three of the four subgroups are relatively well-understood. Consistent with selfdetermination theory (Deci & Ryan, 2000), internal motivation to respond without prejudice is
primary in that, regardless of whether a person is high or low in external motivation, the primary
goal of a person who is high in internal motivation is to reduce and eliminate their prejudice
(Devine et al., 2002; Plant & Devine, 2009). Moreover, people low in both internal and external

motivation to respond without prejudice are unmotivated in that they do not exert effort to
regulate their intergroup behavior. However, people who are low in internal motivation but high
in external motivation have long posed a theoretical and empirical puzzle for researchers
interested in the motivation to respond without prejudice. Specifically, this subgroup of people
reacts to social pressure to act without prejudice towards the target out-group in ways that
suggest more than just a lack of intentions to respond without prejudice towards that out-group
(e.g., Plant & Devine, 1998; Plant & Devine, 2001; Plant & Devine, 2009; Cox & Devine, 2014).
Consider an illustrative study by Plant and Devine (2009), which was designed to
illuminate the specific intentions that underlie peoples’ efforts to respond without prejudice.
Plant and Devine led their participants to believe that they were going to have an interracial
interaction. Prior to the interracial interaction, the participants were given the opportunity to
complete what was described as a prejudice reduction program that would have one of a variety
of different consequences for the participant’s future behavior. As a behavioral indicator of
interest in the program (and therefore an indicator of the desire to obtain the described
consequences of that program), Plant and Devine measured the amount of time the participants
chose to spend on the prejudice reduction program.
When the prejudice reduction program was described as reducing forms of prejudice that
would be detectable in the upcoming interaction, people high in external motivation but low in
internal motivation spent a relatively long time in the prejudice reduction program. This pattern
of behavior is consistent with the idea that this subgroup of people is concerned about appearing
prejudiced toward others. However, when the prejudice reduction program was described as
reducing both prejudice that was detectable by the interaction partner and prejudice that was
undetectable by the interaction partner, people high in internal motivation but low in external

motivation refused to spend much time in the prejudice reduction program, despite the fact that
this refusal would presumably come at the cost of appearing relatively prejudiced in the
upcoming interaction. Apparently, reducing undetectable forms of prejudice is inconsistent with
the identity of people who are high in external motivation but low in internal motivation, to the
point where people in this subgroup are willing to pay a cost to avoid reducing their undetectable
prejudice. This interpretation is further supported by the fact that, when the prejudice reduction
program was described as reducing detectable prejudice and increasing undetectable prejudice,
people high in external motivation and low in internal motivation spent a relatively long time in
the program. Overall, these patterns of data are difficult to explain with psychological constructs
that do not directly implicate intentions to express prejudice, such as unintentionally activated
associations, the motivations to respond without prejudice, and racial attitudes. Instead, these
patterns of data suggest that some people possess intentions toward out-groups that motivate
prejudicial behavior.
If one reflects on the historical events that originally inspired the empirical study of
prejudice, it should not be surprising that some people possess intentions to express prejudice
towards outgroups. Indeed, it is hard to imagine a psychological explanation for the extreme
anti-Semitism in Nazi Germany that does not draw on the idea of prejudicial intentions towards
Jews. Modern prejudice researchers seem to have lost sight of the events that motivated the
original development of their field, perhaps because of the modern paradox of unintentional bias
and the theories and methods that were developed to explain this paradox. However, to
understand the full range of intergroup phenomena, we argue that we need to reclaim the insights
of classic prejudice research. Reclaiming these insights will enable us to develop theory and
methodology required to understand motivated prejudice.

As a first step in this direction, we developed a direct measure of the motivation to
express prejudice (Forscher et al., under review). We reasoned that, similar to the motivation to
respond without prejudice, people might be motivated to express prejudice for either internal or
external reasons, so we created internal and external subscales of our motivation to express
prejudice scale. Some example items of the resultant scale include “My beliefs motivate me to
express negative views about Black people” (internal) and “I minimize my contact with Black
people in order to avoid disapproval from others” (external). We then validated our measure by
testing its psychometric properties and its convergent, discriminant, and predictive validity.
In our typical college samples, most people scored low in the motivation to express
prejudice. Moreover, people who scored high in one of the motivational subscales also tended to
score high in the other. We obtained evidence that the strong relationship between the internal
and external subscales is linked to the local normative climate; when the local norms oppose a
person’s motivation to express prejudice, the internal and external motivations to express
prejudice become strongly linked, perhaps the general difficulty of maintaining an internal
motivation without the support of important others. Regardless of the specific reasons for the
strong correlation between the internal and external subscales, for the results described in the
following paragraphs, we averaged together the internal and external subscales of the motivation
to express prejudice scale.
Overall, our results strongly supported the hypothesis that the motivation to express
prejudice is a construct that is independent from the motivation to respond without prejudice.
The motivation to express prejudice scale had good reliability, as assessed through an internal
consistency measure and through test-retest correlations. The motivation to express prejudice
was also positively related to measures of related constructs, such as Right-Wing

Authoritarianism (Altemeyer, 1996) and Social Dominance Orientation (Pratto, Sidanius,
Stallworth, & Malle, 1994), and negatively related to measures of constructs inconsistent with
the motivation to express prejudice, such as the internal motivation to respond without prejudice
and measures of positive attitudes towards the target group. The scale was also unrelated to
measures of constructs that it should not be related to, such as self-monitoring (Snyder, 1974),
social desirability (Crowne & Marlow, 1960), and the external motivation to respond without
prejudice (Plant & Devine, 1998). Moreover, when we allowed the interaction between the
internal and external motivations to respond without prejudice to predict the motivation to
express prejudice, people high in the external motivation to respond without prejudice and low in
the internal motivation to respond without prejudice were highest in the motivation to express
prejudice. This result may help shed light on why this subgroup of people exhibit patterns of
behavior in past literature suggesting more than a lack of a motivation to respond without
prejudice – perhaps this subgroup of people resents the pressure they feel from society to
respond without prejudice towards a particular group (Plant & Devine, 2001), to the point that
expressing covert prejudice towards that target group has become an important part of their
identity.
We tested the predictive validity of the motivation to express prejudice scale in two ways:
first, by testing whether the Black version of the scale predicted resistance to efforts to promote
racial diversity, and second, by testing whether the gay version of the scale predicted voting for
political candidates who oppose same-sex marriage on the basis of anti-gay rhetoric. In the first
study, we led our participants to believe that we were gathering arguments about a student
organization, BadgerConnect, that had the goal of increasing interactions and friendships
between Black and White students. The participants were further informed that they would be

asked to write an essay about BadgerConnect, which would be posted on a public website where
other students could read and discuss it. Following past induced compliance research (e.g., Elliot
& Devine, 1994), we then subtly induced the participants to write an essay either for or against
BadgerConect. We measured whether the participants refused to write the essay of their
assigned stance, as well as their evaluations of antoher essay, their own essay, and the stance of
the comments they wrote on their own essay. Consistent with our arguments that the motivation
to express prejudice is linked to an identity consistent with expressions of prejudice, people high
in the motivation to express prejudice were likely to refuse to write a pro-BadgerConnect essay.
If they did agree to write an anti-BadgerConnect essay, people high in the motivation to express
prejudice undermined the strength of this support by evaluating others’ anti-BadgerConnect
essays favorably, evaluating their own pro-BadgerConnect unfavorably, and writing antiBadgerConect comments on their own pro-BadgerConnect essays. These effects held when
controlling for attitudes and the motivations to respond without prejudice, suggesting that our
new measure is not identical with these alternative constructs.
In our second study, we told the participants that we were comparing voting behavior in
the lab with voting behavior from a real local election for the state House of Representatives.
The participants then read about three candidates for the election who varied in their stances and
rhetoric about a potential ban on same-sex marriage. One of the candidates supported the ban
with anti-gay rhetoric, a second supported the ban with rhetoric based on “family values,”, and a
third opposed the ban with equality rhetoric. We measured the participants’ perceptions of the
three candidates, their choice of votes for one of the candidates, and their choice of which
candidate to publicly support in a debate with another pro-gay participant. People high in the
motivation to express prejudice perceived the candidate who supported the ban with anti-gay

rhetoric relatively positively and were relatively likely to vote for and publicly support this
candidate, even controlling for attitudes and the motivations to respond without prejudice.
Our work on the motivations to express prejudice provides a valuable case study in how
attending to the intentional aspects of prejudice can help resolve theoretical and empirical
puzzles extant in modern prejudice research. Our new understanding of why people high in
external motivation but low in internal motivation are particularly negative in their responding
toward outgroups would not have been possible by solely focusing on unintentional bias, since
the processes implicated in producing unintentional bias circumvent intentions. Moreover, our
insights would not have been possible by solely focusing on attitudes, since attitudes are not
necessarily directly related to the machinery involved in the production of intentions, such as
motivation, standards, and values. By providing direct evidence that some forms of prejudice are
motivated, we hope that we can help broaden researchers’ conceptions of prejudice and thereby
reconnect modern research with the insights of classic prejudice research.
Summary and conclusion: Prejudice involves both intentional and unintentional processes
In this chapter, we have described how researcher conceptualizations of prejudice have
been shaped by a combination of events in the research world and the real world. Specifically,
we have argued that World War II caused prejudice researchers to focus on the intentional
aspects of prejudice, and that this focus on intentional prejudice persisted through the Civil
Rights Movement. However, newly developed theory and methodology in the 1990s caused
researchers to focus on the unintentional aspects of prejudice at the expense of our understanding
of its intentional aspects, with the inadvertent consequence that modern prejudice researchers are
ill-equipped to understand phenomena that are most likely intentional, such as hate-crimes.
Finally, we argued that, if we wish to gain a complete understanding of intergroup phenomena,

we must fuse the insights of classic and modern research so that we understand the full range of
interactions between intentions, norms, and cognitive and motivational processes in intergroup
situations.
More broadly, modern prejudice researchers must recognize that prejudice is more than
just unintentional bias. Prejudice research has a healthy tradition of studying the intentional
aspects of prejudice that has been all but lost in the theoretical and methodological developments
of the 1990s. Focusing on the intentional aspects of prejudice will reconnect modern prejudice
researchers with the insights of early prejudice researchers. Reconnecting with past insights will
broaden the range of phenomena that prejudice researchers are equipped to explain and the range
of societal problems that prejudice researchers can help resolve.
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